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1 - Our planet faces unprecedented threats, including irrever-
sible global warming, loss in biodiversity, and water pollution
and scarcity. The impacts of these environmental crises also
threaten human rights and exacerbate inequality within and
between countries and populations. 1 Slowing or halting these
worsening environmental trends – and addressing the impacts
of environmental change on diverse populations – will require
cumulative policy responses at the national and international
levels.
2 - Fortunately, there are efforts to align globally around these
challenges. The centrality of clean water and air, diverse ecosys-
tems, rich soils and other elements of a healthy environment to
human life and health has been recognized in numerous regio-
nal and international instruments and declarations over the past
50 years, and is included in many countries’ constitutions. 2
Agenda 2030, universally adopted by all of the world’s govern-
ments in 2015, also emphasizes and elaborates on the environ-
mental crises and goals over the coming decade, including speci-
fic targets for governments, private sector entities and other actors
to work toward. Following the adoption of Agenda 2030, seve-
ral countries have advocated for a Global Pact for the Environ-
ment to create a framework for the international protection of the
right to a healthy environment, as codified and reflected in the
varied declarations, laws and conventions. 3
3 - Concurrently with the elaboration of the right to a healthy
environment has emerged both the concept and diverse and
broad movements for environmental justice. There is no one
definition of environmental justice ; the term has been used diffe-
rently in different contexts and by different populations. Indeed,
the « breadth of concepts used in defining environmental justice
illustrates that the term is quite broad, integrated, expansive, and
inclusive, embodying a variety of understandings of justice
itself. » 4 However, the central, inter-related elements of the
notion of environmental justice are those of « equity and distri-
bution, individual and cultural recognition, political participa-
tion, and individual and community functioning. » 5 These prin-
ciples of environmental justice have likewise been codified or
incorporated in instruments, institutions and practices at the
international level (such as with the UNECE Convention on
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters) as well as at the
domestic level (for instance, with the United States Environmen-
tal Protection Agency’s Office of Environmental Justice).
4 - Yet in the race to take action to protect the environment and
humanity’s equitable and sustainable use of the planet’s
resources, many policymakers and advocates have overlooked
how provisions buried in thousands of bilateral and multilateral
investment agreements have stymied such critical policies and
threaten to do so at an increasing scale. This is due to the
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism, found in
most international investment agreements (IIAs) including both
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and the investment chapters
of free trade agreements (FTAs). This mechanism allows a speci-
fic subset of actors – international asset holders, often multina-
tional enterprises – to sue host governments for government
measures that undermine their actual or expected profitability,
no matter the objective of the challenged measure. As a conse-
quence, environmental measures are vulnerable to attack under
those provisions when they impose additional costs on or othe-
rwise negatively impact multinational enterprises and other inter-
national investors. This not only has negative implications for
environmental protection, but also for the justice dimensions of
environmental law and policy.
5 - As this chapter describes further, this private dispute mecha-
nism limits governments’ willingness and ability to adopt and
enforce policies meant to protect citizens and the environment
from potentially harmful corporate activities and has important
implications for the future of environmental justice. The impacts
of these treaties and of ISDS is only recently becoming clear ;
most of the more than 3,300 treaties have been signed within the
past forty years or so. 6 Disputes brought under the ISDS mecha-
nism of these treaties are even more recent ; as of July 31, 2019,
1. G. Reeh, ’Human Rights and the Environment : The UN Human Rights
Committee Affirms the Duty to Protect,’ (Blog of the European Journal of Inter-
national Law, 9 September 2019) <https ://www.ejiltalk.org/human-rights-
and-the-environment-the-un-human-rights-committee-affirms-the-duty-to-
protect/> accessed 1 November 2019.
2. For a summary, see « Report of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human
rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and
sustainable environment »., A/73/50, 19 July 2018, available at http://
srenvironment.org/sites/default/files/Reports/2018/
Boyd%20Knox%20UNGA%20report%202018.pdf.
3. Global Pact for the Environment, Objectives, <https ://
globalpactenvironment.org/en/> accessed 6 September 2019.
4. D. Schlosberg, Defining environmental justice : theories, movements, and
nature (Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2007), at 52.
5. Ibid., at 79.
6. Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, Primer : International Invest-
ment Treaties and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, <http://
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983 known disputes had been filed, with more disputes brought
confidentially 7 and others threatened and then settled, formally
(23% of all cases brought between 1987 and 2018) 8 or infor-
mally, before an award was issued. 9 Half of all known disputes
have been brought between 2012 and 2018, 10 and in 2018,
70% of the 50 substantive decisions by tribunals were made in
favor of the investors. 11
6 - Investor-state dispute settlement allows investors to remove
disputes they have with host states, and stakeholders within
them, from domestic administrative and judicial processes and
norms. Investors are able to frame those disputes as alleged
breaches of international investment law, and put them before
ad-hoc, party-appointed, party-paid tribunals. Those tribunals
are unconstrained by domestic rules and procedures and able to
decide disputes without due consideration or deference to other
obligations, rights, or policies of the host governments under
domestic or international law, or rights and interests of third-
parties relevant to or affected by the dispute. 12
7 - While the mechanism is often described as providing inves-
tors with a mechanism of last resort they can use to challenge
unremedied losses caused by uncompensated nationalizations
appropriating the investors’ property, or bad faith, corrupt, or
discriminatory conduct by host states, the reality appears quite
different. 13 Rather, investors have commonly used the ISDS
mechanism to challenge government measures adopted in good
faith to address issues of public concern, including those taken
in the public interest to protect the life, health, and security of
people or planet ; and tribunals have not only welcomed these
claims but have awarded investor claimants substantial sums, out
of public coffers, to compensate investors for economic impacts
on their investments, including in many cases, alleged future lost
profits.
8 - First, this article explains the various ways in which IIAs and
ISDS affect environmental protection and justice, including by
chilling legitimate and necessary regulation and enforcement.
Second, the article illustrates how ISDS has undermined speci-
fic environmental measures, using examples of challenged
actions to address the climate crisis and to protect water
resources. Third, the article describes how ISDS undermines
governance, democratic processes, and rights, including envi-
ronmental impact assessments (EIAs) and stakeholder participa-
tion in them, the processes of environmental decision-making, 14
and efforts to protect communities’ rights to representation and
access to justice. 15 This article adds to existing literature that has
documented how ISDS has been used to challenge environmen-
tal protection and policy making by looking at the implications
of ISDS on other dimensions of environmental justice. It also
adds to the debate regarding undue regulatory chill and regula-
tory risk-shifting by elaborating on theories explaining why and
how ISDS can have these effects, and documenting additional
ISDS cases challenging good faith environmental protection and
policymaking. The article concludes with recommendations on
how states can address the systemic impact of IIAs and ISDS on
states’ regulatory space over environmental and other public
interest matters.
1. Impact of IIAs and ISDS on
Environmental Governance
9 - As other studies have highlighted, 16 IIAs and ISDS cases
challenge environmental protection in several ways.
10 - First, they increase the cost of environmental measures. If
a government acts to address an issue of environmental concern
– whether by passing new legislation or regulations, producing
new or clarified interpretations of existing laws or regulations,
adopting judicial or administrative decisions approving, rejec-
ting, or otherwise shaping the governance of an investment
ccsi.columbia.edu/2019/06/03/primer-international-investment-treaties-
and-investor-state-dispute-settlement/> accessed 1 November 2019.
7. Investment Policy Hub, Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, <https ://
investmentpolicy.unctad.org/investment-dispute-settlement> accessed 1
December 2019. Not all arbitration rules require disclosure of the legal chal-
lenge or of the related case materials. Columbia Center on Sustainable Invest-




8. UNCTAD, ’Review of ISDS Decisions in 2018 : Selected IIA Reform Issues’
(2019) UNCTAD IIA Issues Note, Issue 4.
9. For example, a report listing possible reasons for China’s previously low
profile in ISDS cases suggests it may be due to the country’s preference for
settling such disputes informally through diplomatic discussion. D. Pathi-
rana, ’A Look into China’s Slowly Increasing Appearance in ISDS Cases,’
Investment Treaty News (26 September 2017).
10. Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, Primer : International Invest-
ment Treaties and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, <http://
ccsi.columbia.edu/2019/06/03/primer-international-investment-treaties-
and-investor-state-dispute-settlement/> accessed 1 November 2019.
11. Either on jurisdictional grounds or on merits. UNCTAD, ’Review of ISDS
Decisions in 2018 : Selected IIA Reform Issues’ (2019) UNCTAD IIA Issues
Note, Issue 4.
12. Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, Primer : International Invest-
ment Treaties and Investor-State Dispute Settlement, <http://
ccsi.columbia.edu/2019/06/03/primer-international-investment-treaties-
and-investor-state-dispute-settlement/> accessed 1 November 2019.
13. There have been only a few cases, for instance, involving a tribunal’s finding
that the government acted in bad faith or discriminated against the investor
on account of its nationality. With respect to bad faith, the authors searched
cases available in the « Investor-State Law Guide » database for the terms
« bad faith ». While, as of December 11, 2019, 249 interim and final awards
had that phrase, only a few indicated a finding by the tribunal that the govern-
ment had indeed acted in bad faith. See, for instance, Yukos Universal Ltd
v. Russia, PCA Case No. 2005-04/AA227, Final Award, 18 July 2014 (sugges-
ting that the taxes assessed were not good faith measures aimed at raising
public revenue) ; Conocophillips Petrozuata B.V., Conocophillips Hamaca
B.V. and Conocophillips Gulf of Paria B.V. v. Venezuela, ICSID Case No.
ARB/07/30, Interim Decision, January 17, 2017 (finding that the tribunal had
not previously concluded the government had acted in bad faith). Similarly,
of the 209 decided disputes in the UNCTAD database as of December 13,
2019, only nine involved a finding that there had been a national treatment
violation. Moreover, none involved a finding of discrimination against the
investment on account of the investor’s nationality. The cases instead
involved findings that there had been disparate treatment of foreign inves-
tors based on factors other than nationality, factors that seemed unclear or
unjustified to tribunals, or disparate treatment of investments arising from,
or based on implications for, structures and locations of production along
global value chains. In terms of direct expropriations, UNCTAD’s database
reveals that the successful claims (40) relate to government actions cance-
ling projects due, for instance, to concerns about the impacts of the projects
or the investors’ conduct in relation to them (e.g., as in Copper Mesa v. Ecua-
dor, discussed infra), government efforts to raise and collect taxes paid by
projects (e.g., as in Burlington v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Deci-
sion on Liability, Award, December 12, 2012), and/or disputes involving the
government’s takeover of projects. The latter have been concentrated in
disputes involving just two countries, Russia and Venezuela. Additionally,
where there have been findings of improper conduct, including allegations
of uncompensated expropriation, the claims are generally pursued before
remedies have been exhausted domestically, meaning it is unclear that any
errors or other misconduct would have remained unremedied by the state
absent the ISDS claim.
14. Mobil and Murphy v. Canada (I), Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4 (ICSID. 2007).
15. E.g. Copper Mesa v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2012-2 ; Bear Creek Mining v.
Peru, Case No. ARB/14/21 (ICSID. 2014).
16. J. Viñuales, ’Foreign Investment and the Environment in International Law,’
(2012) Cambridge University Press ; K. Miles (e.d.), ’Research Handbook on
Environment and Investment Law,’ (2019) E. Elgar ; K. Tienhaara. ’The Expro-
priation of Environmental Governance : Protecting Foreign Investors at the
Expense of Public Policy,’ (2009) Cambridge : Cambridge University Press ;
T. Slater., « Investor-State Arbitration and Domestic Environmental Protec-
tion », in Washington University Global Studies Law Review, Vol. 14, n° 1,
2015.
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project – and those actions negatively impact investors’ actual
or expected profits, covered investors can challenge those
actions in arbitration. The arbitration costs alone can raise the
actual cost of adopting and implementing the measure, which
can potentially shape the respondent government’s (or even
other governments’) willingness and ability to adopt or maintain
that or similar measures in the future. 17 Settlement of threatened
and actual claims is also common, even though the settlement
itself or its terms are rarely known. 18 One may assume that, in
such cases, something is being given for the decision to drop a
case, whether financial (which increases the cost of action) or
regulatory (which is an agreement to stop, slow, or limit regula-
tory action, or to approve projects or terms that would otherwise
be rejected). 19 If an ISDS case proceeds and the government is
found liable and ordered to pay the investor, the actual costs of
environmental measures are even higher (often substantially so),
in addition to the likely chill on the government’s willingness to
adopt similar measures or enforce them against other inves-
tors. 20
11 - Second, in terms of political costs, each suit alleges a viola-
tion of international law, a serious charge against countries that
can cause respondent countries’ reputations to suffer in the eyes
of investors, other states, and other international law adjudica-
tors and systems. Particularly if the measure reflects the policy
preferences of a less politically powerful actor within the
respondent country, such as a local municipality or an environ-
mental agency, the country’s executive leadership may deem the
political cost of sacrificing that subsidiary entity’s policy choice
to be less than the cost of maintaining a course of action alleged
to be inconsistent with international law (or other countries’ or
investors’ interpretations of that law).
12 - Third, ISDS exacerbates the disproportionate power of
investors relative to other domestic constituents. Legal systems
outside of the ISDS context provide very little room for citizens
or entities to take governments to task in any meaningful, conse-
quential way for environmental inaction. Theory and research
suggest that the regulatory state already tends to sit in a rather
constant state of chill (especially when looking at the extent of
action against well-resourced and financed groups). 21 ISDS rein-
forces that stagnation, enabling greater pushback against any
movement in the direction of environmental protection, particu-
larly when that movement would run counter to powerful vested
interests.
13 - Fourth, ISDS can make it legally impossible to maintain the
challenged measure. While not commonly done, tribunals can
and have used powers of injunctive relief to order governments
to do, or not do, certain things. They have ordered governments,
for instance, not to take administrative enforcement actions in
response to investor violations of domestic law, 22 and have
ordered governments to nullify the effects of court decisions,
including decisions awarding plaintiffs money as compensation
for alleged environmental harms. 23 Additionally, private indi-
viduals and government entities in the host state may be able to
pursue domestic actions to cause the removal of measures ISDS
tribunals have deemed to violate the treaty. 24
14 - Fifth, and relatedly, ISDS cases have norm-shifting and
norm-creating effects. Indeed, « the debate over the extent to
which the provisions of international trade and investment agree-
ments can ’chill’ domestic policy--including climate policy--
seems strangely detached from more general assumptions about
the normative force of international law. » 25 The very purpose
of international treaties is to reduce domestic policy space, and
ISDS decisions have largely failed to recognize or clarify govern-
ments’ retained powers to adopt environmental (or other public
interest measures) in the interest of their populations. To the
contrary, decisions have expanded key dimensions of the scope
of investor protections over time ; 26 holding that investors are
able to enforce expectations that are invalid and nonexistent
under domestic law ; 27 limiting the polluter pays principle ; 28
concluding that environmental or similar exceptions only apply
17. See, e.g., Congressional Research Service, ’Government Contract Bid
Protests : Analysis of Legal Processes and Recent Developments,’ (2018)
(discussing the potential impact that litigation can have on agency action and
public funding) ; on regulatory chill, see, K. Tienhaara, ’Regulatory Chill in
a Warming World : The Threat to Climate Policy Posed by Investor-State
Dispute Settlement’ (2018) 7 Transnational Environmental Law 2 : 229-250 ;
J. Brown, ’International Investment Agreements : Regulatory Chill in the Face
of Litigious Heat ?’ (2013) 3 Western Journal of Legal Studies 1 ; G. Van
Harten and D. N. Scott, ’Investment Treaties and Internal Vetting of Regu-
latory Proposals : A Case Study from Canada,’ (2016) 7 Journal of Interna-
tional Dispute Settlement 1 : 92-116.
18. E. M. Hafner-Burton, S. Puig, and D. G. Victor, ’Against Secrecy : The Social
Cost of International Dispute Settlement,’ (2017) 45 Yale Journal of Interna-
tional Law 279.
19. This latter type of « chill » – e.g., the issuance of a permit or permit terms
coveted by an investor irrespective of the degree of compliance with envi-
ronmental law or policy – is not captured by Berge and Berger’s assessment
of « systemic » regulatory chill.
20. If, for instance, an investor challenges one new environmental measure as
applied to its project, and the tribunal orders the government pay the costs
of that measure, other investors can bring follow-on suits similarly seeking
compensation.
21. See, e.g., See generally R. E. Barkow, ’Insulating Agencies : Avoiding Capture
Through Institutional Design,’ (2010) 89 Texas Law Review 15, 26-64 ;
N. Bagley & R. L. Revesz, ’Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State,’
(2006) 106 Columbia Law Review 1260, 1287-90 ; R. A. Kagan, ’Editor’s
Introduction : Understanding Regulatory Enforcement,’ (1989) 11 Law and
Policy 89.
22. See, e.g., Perenco v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision on Remai-
ning Issues of Jurisdiction and Liability, September 12, 2014, paras. 434-35.
23. Chevron v. Ecuador, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2009-23, Second Partial
Award on Track II, August 30, 2018 (reiterating and reconfirming orders to
remove the enforceability and prevent enforcement of the « Lago Agrio »
award).
24. Some contend that ISDS decisions do not actually interfere with regulatory
prerogatives as they simply require that compensation be paid for allegedly
offending measures, not that such measures be removed. But that argument
ignores both the fact that tribunals have in fact ordered the removal of chal-
lenged measures, and that domestic actors can also potentially use the
outcomes of ISDS decisions to cause the removal of measures deemed incon-
sistent with the IIA. As Porter and Gallagher explain :
« The assertion that trade and investment rules cannot modify domestic law
appears to be based on an inaccurate assumption that these rules lack domes-
tic legal effect. The domestic status of international law is usually discussed
in the context of the distinction between the »monist« approach, which treats
international law as part of the same legal system as domestic law, and
the »dualist« approach, which treats it as a distinct legal system. »
M. Porterfield, et al., ’Assessing the Climate Impacts of US Trade Agreements’
(2017) 7 Michigan Journal of Environmental and Administrative Law 51, 66.
In the US, for instance, which contains features of monism and dualism,
« implementing legislation for U.S. trade agreements typically provides that
federal law may not be challenged in federal court on the grounds that it is
inconsistent with a provision of a trade agreement. In contrast, the federal
government may seek judgments in federal court declaring that state or local
laws--including climate measures--are preempted by a trade or investment
rule. » Id. at 73-74. This means that if a decision was rendered by an ISDS
tribunal finding a local measure to breach an IIA, the federal government
could sue domestically for the removal of that measure based on its incon-
sistency with the treaty.
25. Id. at 75.
26. Bilcon v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award, March 17, 2015, paras
435, 438.
27. See, e.g., Tethyan Copper v. Pakistan, Case No. ARB/12/1 (ICSID. 2012) ; see
also L. Johnson, ’A Fundamental Shift in Power : Permitting International
Investors to Convert Their Economic Expectations into Rights’ (2018)
Discourse.
28. Burlington v. Ecuador, Case No. ARB/08/05 (ICSID. 2008), Interim Decision
on the Environmental Counterclaim, August 11, 2015, paras. 356-57. The
tribunal in this case rejected Ecuador’s argument that a strict liability regime
applied to govern responsibility for pollution during the investor’s oil opera-
tions.
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if the government was acting to resolve a problem created by the
investor’s wrongful conduct ; 29 and discounting the relevance
of local concerns and legal complaints about environmental or
livelihood related risks of projects when determining whether
projects would have or should have gone ahead. 30 More
broadly, one cannot find an example of a tribunal rejecting a
claim against an environmental measure on the ground that such
claims are facially meritless and outside of what the treaties were
established to do.
15 - These complex and often non-transparent ways in which
actual or threatened ISDS cases, or even the risk of such cases,
impact on decision making and outcomes, all contribute to the
systemic ’chill’ that IIAs and ISDS have on environmental action.
Literature and available evidence likely underestimate the extent
of such regulatory chill. 31 Indeed, as is often noted, chill is diffi-
cult to document, 32 particularly but not only because of the
confidentiality of informal or even formal settlements, the
extreme difficulty of measuring inaction or shifts in power dyna-
mics and norms over time, and the effects those have on different
areas of policy.
A. - Implications for Climate Action
16 - The international scientific community’s assessment that
the world needs to strand 80% of proven fossil fuel reserves and
transition to zero-carbon energy systems 33 in order to avoid the
most disastrous consequences of global warming has enormous
implications for global investments. While trillions of dollars of
new investments will be required to meet growing demands for
clean energy, significant existing investments in fossil fuel extrac-
tion, transmission, and processing will have to be urgently
phased out. In line with goals and commitments agreed by the
international community, individual countries are increasingly
adopting a range of policy tools to shift energy generation and
transmission, including phasing out coal-fired power plants,
adopting mechanisms like carbon-pricing schemes, or
employing other regulatory tools, such as fuel efficiency stan-
dards, methane leakage, and emissions controls. 34 Additional
measures will be necessary, including the revocation or modi-
fication of permits for exploration for, extraction of, and power
generation from fossil fuel resources. 35
17 - Each of these measures will impact the profitability (and
in some cases, viability) of investments related to carbon-
intensive energy, the types of economic impacts that have trig-
gered ISDS claims. Measures to mitigate climate change that are
vulnerable to being challenged through ISDS claims include, but
are certainly not limited to, strengthening performance standards
and emissions limits, the imposition of carbon taxes, energy
source phase-outs, zone restrictions limiting future development,
and the denial of permits for fossil fuel development or use. 36
18 - Indeed, we have already started seeing the first cases. In
2015, following years of delay, the United States government
rejected TransCanada’s construction permit to build the
Keystone XL Pipeline. Obama announced that the pipeline
would undercut efforts on the part of the government to make the
United States a leader in climate action. TransCanada, in its
notice of arbitration, likened activist opposition (largely from
indigenous groups) as a « litmus test » for politicians and accused
Obama of rejecting the project simply to prove his « environ-
mental credentials ». 37 In its $15 billion ISDS claim against the
United States under the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), the company alleged it had borne substantial expenses
related to the project, and sought compensation for future lost
profits it allegedly expected to earn from the development and
operation of new fossil fuel infrastructure. 38 In addition to clai-
ming that the government’s decision violated the treaty’s fair and
equitable treatment provision and wrongfully expropriated the
investor’s investment, TransCanada also claimed discrimination
against its particular investment project by the government, due
to the fact that no application for a Presidential permit for cross-
border pipelines had ever been previously rejected. 39 Ultima-
tely, the case was withdrawn by TransCanada after President
Trump was elected and approved the resubmitted permit appli-
cation. 40
19 - In 2015, the new provincial government of Alberta,
Canada announced that it would phase out its coal-fired power
29. Bear Creek v. Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award, paras 410-412, 475
(discussing the role of investor fault in addressing the « character » of the
measure for the purpose of determining whether an expropriation had occur-
red, and for the applicability of the treaty’s general exceptions clause). Under
the tribunal’s reasoning, the exception would arguably not apply if the
government were addressing a problem, such as climate change, that exists
irrespective of the investor’s legal « fault ».
30. See, e.g., discussion of Copper Mesa v. Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2012-02, and
Bilcon v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04, infra. investor roughly USD 20
million, representing 70% of the costs it allegedly expended in developing
the project.
31. The authors of recent research into regulatory « chill » in ISDS find that there
is anecdotal evidence of it, but conclude that it is likely not a « systemic »
problem. T. Laudal Berge and A. Berger, ’Does investor-state dispute settle-
ment lead to regulatory chill ? Global evidence from environmental regula-
tion’ (2019) <https ://www.peio.me/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/
PEIO12_Paper_78.pdf> accessed 1 November 2019.
Their data, however, would likely miss many if not most forms of chill, inclu-
ding weakening of regulations or laws from initial proposals through to
passage ; non enforcement of measures ; decisions to grant permits that othe-
rwise might not be allowed, or to include terms that would otherwise not be
offered, and interpretations of domestic laws in ways that internalize norms
of strong investor protections.
32. Ibid.. See also sources on regulatory chill cited supra, n. 17.
33. J. Leaton et. al., ’Unburnable Carbon 2013 : Wasted capital and stranded
assets,’ (2013) Carbon Tracker and Grantham Institute at the London School
of Economics and Political Science.
34. See Climate Change Laws of the World, Grantham Research Institute on
Climate Change and the Environment, available at : http://www.lse.ac.uk/
GranthamInstitute/research-theme/governance-and-legislation/, accessed 10
December 2019.
35. Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project, ’Pathways to deep decarboniza-
tion 2015 report,’ (2015) SDSN – IDDRI ; M. Gerrard and J. Dernbach, Legal
Pathways to Deep Decarbonization in the United States (Environmental Law
Institute 2019).
36. B. Skardvart Güven and L. Johnson, ’International Investment Agreements :
Impacts on Climate Policies in India, China, and Beyond’ in K. P. Gallagher
and C. Barakatt (eds), Trade in the Balance : Reconciling Trade and Climate
Policy Report of the Working Group on Trade, Investment, and Climate
Policy (Boston University, 2016) ; N. Lobel and M. Fermeglia, ’Investment
Protection and Unburnable Carbon : Competing Commitments in Interna-
tional Investment and Climate Governance’ (2018) 4 Diritto del Commer-
cio Internazionale.
37. TransCanada v. United States, Case No. ARB/16/21 (ICSID. 2016), Notice
of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration Under Chapter 11 of NAFTA.
38. Ibid.
39. B. Skardvart Güven and L. Johnson, op. cit.
40. E. Lou, ’TransCanada’s $15 billion U.S. Keystone XL NAFTA suit suspended,’
Reuters (28 February 2017). Since that date, environmental organizations,
indigenous groups and others have filed suit to challenge the new permit.
Those challenges met with some success, as the federal court examining the
permitting decision’s compliance with environmental and administrative
laws found flaws in the government’s environmental review of the pipeline
and the government’s failure to adequately justify its decision to reverse
course and approve the pipeline in 2017. (Indigenous Environmental
Network v United States Department of State, CV-17-29-GF-BMM, Order,
November 8, 2018). In 2019, President Trump revoked the flawed 2017
permit and issued a new presidential permit designed to fall outside the scope
of environmental and administrative law requirements and judicial scrutiny
of those matters. Indigenous Environmental Network v. Trump, CV 19-28-
GF-BMM, Memorandum in Support of Motion by TransCanada Keystone
Pipeline LP and TC Energy Corporation to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Complaint
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 12(b)(1) or 12(b)(6), July 16, 2019).
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plants by 2030 under its Climate Leadership Plan. 41 The plan
included compensation of $1.4 billion to three companies
owning coal-fired plants in connection with their commitment
to switch to natural gas, and to waive any claims against the
government in connection with investments they had made in
coal to feed those plants. In response, Westmoreland, whose
mine-mouth operations supplied coal to some of the phased-out
operations, but did not itself own or operate coal-fired power
generating facilities, alleged that Alberta’s compensation of the
coal-fired power plants but not of the coal mines themselves
breached treaty obligations in the NAFTA to provide fair and
equitable treatment. Westmoreland claimed $357 million in
damages. 42
20 - Lama Energy Group also sued Canada, under the Canada-
Czech Republic bilateral investment treaty (BIT), 43 alleging that
the Government of Alberta was unduly delaying approvals for
their oil sands project, in light of the government’s environmen-
tal concerns. 44 The policies that triggered these actions, howe-
ver, were subsequently reversed ; after the election of conserva-
tive Premier Jason Kenney in June 2019, Lama received
regulatory approval for its project despite pushback from First
Nations groups who claim the activities will put sacred lands and
drinking water at risk. 45
21 - In all three cases above, subsequent reversals of climate-
related policy led to the withdrawal of arbitration by the inves-
tor, indicating a discouraging trend in global policymaking.
While there is not necessarily a causal chain between the launch
of those cases and the government’s subsequent change in posi-
tion, ISDS claims undoubtedly further raise the costs and risks of
climate action for governments that do adopt climate measures,
and offer those governments that are uninclined to adopt bold
climate policies a justification for their inaction.
22 - Mere threats of cases can have similar effects. In the
summer of 2017, spurred by the ambition of the 2015 Paris
Climate Agreement, French Environment Minister Nicolas Hulot
drafted a law that would end fossil fuel extraction on French terri-
tory by 2040. The law would ban the renewal of all exploitation
permits, and if enacted, would mean only a few projects could
have continued to exist after 2030. 46 In reaction to Hulot’s new
law, Vermilion, a Canadian oil and gas company with numerous
extraction sites in France 47, threatened arbitration, alleging that
the planned law would violate numerous provisions under the
Energy Charter Treaty. 48 By September of the same year, the
Government had released a second, drastically weakened draft
of the law, now allowing the renewal of oil exploitation permits
until 2040. 49 Most recently, in response to the Dutch govern-
ment’s announcement in 2018 that it would shut down all coal-
fired power plants by 2030, 50 Uniper, the owner and operator
of one of the country’s largest power plants, threatened arbitra-
tion under the Energy Charter Treaty if the legislation is passed
into law, hoping similarly for a policy reversal. 51
23 - These types of cases, in which investors claim government
action should shift focus onto other actors, be less dramatic,
broaden compensation, or otherwise change strategy, are very
likely to increase in the context of climate change. The scale of
policy change required to transition energy systems will undoub-
tedly create some losers. But ISDS enables covered investors,
alone, to contest their losses on a highly-consequential legal
plane that can stifle crucial action, or disproportionality shift the
cost of action onto others without the same international legal
rights. 52
24 - Through that cost– and risk-shifting, IIAs and ISDS can
create moral hazards, as investors may overinvest in projects that
either contribute to or are not resilient to global warming, relying
on their expectation that they will be compensated if policy
changes course and causes a drop in the value of their invest-
ments. This certainly includes investments in extraction, trans-
mission and refining of fossil fuels, as there is no room in the
remaining carbon budget for any new such projects, but is also
true for other investments that are vulnerable to climate-related
shocks and impacts. 53 Early movers that invest in clean techno-
logies and reducing exposure to adverse weather events may
ironically bear more regulatory and commercial risks and costs
than those laggards that only act when forced to by the govern-
ment, and then sue for costs incurred or losses suffered due to
those measures. Even if those claimants ultimately lose, their
claims will have imposed additional costs and risks on climate
action that targets firms (as opposed to action that is, for instance,
paid for by consumers or taxpayers).
25 - Notably, when oil companies have won ISDS cases, tribu-
nals have awarded compensation that assumes decades of future
profits from the development and sale of their reserves. 54 By
awarding that compensation, tribunals are insulating companies
from the risks of future stranding, and are locking the public into
paying for oil at artificially inflated market prices that do not take
41. The Government of Alberta, Climate Leadership Plan – Implementation Plan
2018-19 (June 2018).
42. Westmoreland v. Canada (UNCITRAL, 2018).
43. Agreement Between Canada and The Czech Republic for the Promotion and
Protection of Investments, 6 May 2009, IC-BT 1157.
44. D. Charlotin, ’Frustrated by Delays in Licensing Process Czech Oilsands
Investor Puts Canada on Notice of a Claim Under Bilateral Investment
Treaty,’ IA Reporter (8 April 2019) available at <https ://www.iareporter.com/
articles/frustrated-by-delays-in-licensing-process-czech-oilsands-investor-
puts-canada-on-notice-of-a-claim-under-bilateral-investment-treaty/>
accessed 1 November 2019.
45. The Canadian Press, ’Alberta Oil Sands Project Wins Regulator Approval
Despite Indigenous Objections,’ The Globe and Mail (13 June 2018).
46. Gouvernement of France, France, the first country to prohibit exploitation of
hydrocarbons (7 September 2019), <https ://www.gouvernement.fr/en/
france-the-first-country-to-prohibit-exploitation-of-hydrocarbons> accessed
1 December 2019.
47. Vermilion Energy, France, <https ://www.vermilionenergy.com/our-opera-
tions/europe/france.cfm> accessed 1 November 2019.
48. Energy Charter Treaty, 2080 UNTS 95 ; 34 ILM 360 (1995).
49. Friends of the Earth France, « End fossil fuels ? » Decrypting Hulot’s Law,
<https ://www.amisdelaterre.org/Mettre-fin-aux-energies-fossiles-Decryp-
tage-de-la-loi-Hulot.html> accessed 1 December 2019.
50. Government of the Netherlands, Climate Policy, <https ://
www.government.nl/topics/climate-change/climate-policy> accessed 1
December 2019 ; Uniper, Annual Report 2017 : Financial Results, 23
<https ://www.uniper.energy/sites/default/files/2018-03/2018-03-
08_fy2017_uniper_annual_report_en.pdf>accessed 1 November 2019.
51. E. Van Der Schoot, ’Claim for coal prohibition for State,’ De Telegraf (5
September 2019).
52. This can be illustrated in myriad ways. There may, for instance, be impor-
tant debates around who bears the cost for fuel-switching. To what extent is
the burden borne by private utility companies ? To what is extent is the
burden borne by users ? To what extent is it borne by taxpayers more gene-
rally ? A government may determine that equities demand it be borne by
private utility companies ; and domestic courts may uphold the legality of
such assessment. But investment treaties give those companies – if foreign
owned – the unique power to challenge such assessments and shift the
burden back to taxpayers or users based, inter alia, on ISDS adjudicators’
perspectives of whether the government’s determination was « unfair » or
« inequitable » to those companies or investors.
53. See, e.g., K. Bos and J. Gupta, Stranded Assets and Stranded Resources :
Implications for Climate Change Mitigation and Global Sustainable Deve-
lopment 56 Energy Research & Social Science 101215 (2019) (discussing
potential for stranding, and challenges and policy implications of providing
compensation to owners of stranded fossil fuel-related assets).
54. See, e.g., Perenco v. Ecuador, Case No. ARB/08/06 (ICSIDE. 2008) Award,
September 27, 2019 (not including any reference to climate change or stran-
ding of assets in the discussion of the future price of oil).
94
LA REVUE DES JURISTES DE SCIENCES PO - N° 18 - JANVIER 2020Dossier thématique
into account the externalities and risks associated with extrac-
tion and sale of the commodity.
26 - As cities, states and countries continue to adopt policies
in line with their international commitments and in response to
domestic pressures and climate-related incidents to address the
mounting climate crisis, the threat of additional ISDS cases
mounts. The risks of ISDS are both that governments will be
deterred from taking such critical measures (or will reverse the
measures in response to a filed suit) and that governments will
provide free risk insurance to investors for fossil-fuel-related
investments, distorting investment decisions and incentives and
increasing the public costs of climate action.
B. - Implications for Quality of and Access to Water
Resources
27 - Treaty protections, as they have been interpreted by invest-
ment tribunals, have also allowed investors to challenge govern-
ments’ prerogative to protect water resources from contamina-
tion and ensure that water is accessible and affordable to all. In
Romania, Gabriel Resources was developing the Rosia Montana
gold and silver mine when conflicts arose surrounding the poten-
tial threats the mine posed to nearby water sources. Pressured in
part by environmental groups, Romania declined to issue neces-
sary environmental permits to the company for fear of cyanide
pollution, particularly given recent memory of the cyanide spill
and subsequent environmental disaster in 2000, in which Roma-
nia was found by the European Court of Human Rights to be
liable by failing to conduct an adequate environmental impact
assessment (EIA). 55 Gabriel Resources filed a request for arbitra-
tion in 2015, contending that non-issuance of the environmen-
tal permit breached treaty protections. 56 As of 2017, they had
invested $700 million to finance the project. 57 The company is
seeking $4.4 billion in damages from Romania, roughly 2% of
Romania’s GDP. 58
28 - On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, a U.S. company,
Lone Pine, which holds permits for petroleum and natural gas
exploration in the Utica basin in Canada, claimed $100 million
from Canada after Quebec implemented a moratorium on frac-
king below the St. Lawrence River, in response to concerns about
the impacts of fracking and other development activities on the
water source. 59 And in Colombia, a series of cases were brought
against the country after the Colombian Constitutional Court
ordered the prohibition of mining activities in páramos (wetland)
regions in 2016, in order to preserve an important source of the
country’s water supply. As a consequence of this decision, the
National Mining Agency reduced the size of several mining
companies’ concession areas in order to exclude areas located
within conservation zones. Eco Oro Minerals Corp., Red Eagle
Exploration Limited, and Galway Gold all brought separate cases
against Colombia in response. Combined, their claims amount
to almost $1 billion. 60
29 - The case of Indonesia’s struggle with several foreign
mining companies in 2004 is a well-investigated instance of
regulatory chill and its deleterious effects on the environment.
Shortly after the end of the dictatorial Suharto government in
1998, the new President enacted a forestry law restricting open-
pit mining in certain areas where these activities posed a threat
to water supplies. 61 Following the President’s announcement,
several foreign mining companies made private threats to arbi-
trate. By the government’s assessment, Indonesia could have
faced billions of dollars in damages if these suits were brought.
Meanwhile, violent clashes between local villages and parami-
litary officers guarding a mining site broke out. Two months
following the deadly clash, in 2004, the Indonesian president
issued an emergency decree that exempted twelve mining
companies from the new forestry law. Today, eight of these
twelve companies have mined in protected forest areas. The indi-
genous population has had to endure environmental destruction,
including harm to local water resources from mining waste
discharge-outcomes the forestry law had set out to prevent. 62
30 - This is one of many instances where just the threat of arbi-
tration has been enough to turn around new environmental regu-
lation, allowing companies to hold on to advantages won under
previous regimes. This is egregious in the context of companies’
locking in promises from dictatorial regimes, as with Suharto and
also in Libya post-Qaddafi and in Egypt post-Mubarak. 63 Howe-
ver, it is equally problematic in prohibiting the evolution and
improvement of water management practices in democratic
regimes, given the need for governments to be able to respond
to the growing global water crisis, greater contestation over water
uses, evolving technologies, and improved knowledge of the
value of ecosystem services, among other factors that influence
policies.
C. - Implications for Environmental Justice
31 - As described above, ensuring environmental justice
requires deliberative policy-making processes and outcomes that
ensure equity, informed participation (including but not only of
the most marginalized voices), and just representation. ISDS can
undermine these democratic and deliberative processes, prevent
the informed participation of interested parties, and result in
outcomes that dramatically skew the proportional weight of
environmental risks and impacts. The following sections describe
the impacts of ISDS on aspects of environmental justice.
1° Environmental Impact Assessments and
Stakeholder Participation in Them
32 - Environmental impact assessments are widely accepted
and relied upon features of government approval processes, used
to identify and inform governments and other stakeholders of
anticipated environmental impacts from certain proposed
projects. 64 The identified and assessed impacts are intended to
guide decision making, including the gateway decision of
55. T?tar v. Romania, Case No. 67021/01 (ECHR. 2009).
56. Gabriel Resources v. Romania, Case No. RB/15/31 (ICSID. 2015).
57. G. Rosia Montana, ’Annual Information Form of Gabriel Resources LTD. For
the Year Ended December 31, 2017’ (30 April 2018) <http://
www.gabrielresources.com/site/documents/
AIF_2018_Master_Filing_300418.pdf> accessed 1 November 2019.
58. The World Bank, The World Bank in Romania, <https ://
www.worldbank.org/en/country/romania/overview> accessed 7 August
2019.
59. Lone Pine v. Canada, Case No. UNCT/15/2. (ICSID. 2013).
60. Eco Oro v. Colombia, Case No. ARB/16/41. (ICSID. 2016) ; Red Eagle v.
Colombia, Case No. ARB/18/12. (ICSID. 2018) ; Galway Gold v. Colombia,
Case No. ARB/18/13. (ICSID. 2018).
61. Act No. 41 of 1999 Dated September 30, 1999 Re Forestry Affairs, <https ://
www.documentcloud.org/documents/3032117-1999-Forestry-
Law.html>.
62. C. Hamby, ’The Secret Threat That Makes Corporations More Powerful Than
Countries,’ BuzzFeed News (30 August 2016). Similarly, after a forestry law
was passed in Ghana which imposed a moratorium on mining, the govern-
ment nonetheless allowed mining activities to continue in protected forests
due to ISDS threats from American, Canadian and South African corpora-
tions. K. Tienhaara. op. cit.
63. Chris Hamby, ibid.
64. EIAs are also increasingly seen as being required under international law, and
are included in both the Escazù Agreement and Aarhus Convention. Regio-
nal Agreement on Access to Information, Public Participation and Justice in
Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean (Escazù Agree-
ment) adopted in Escazù, Costa Rica (4 March 2018). Convention on Access
to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice
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whether or not to approve a proposed project and how to shape
it.
33 - While domestic institutions have pathways for challenging
any determinations made on the basis of an EIA, investors have
used ISDS to bypass those domestic processes, including domes-
tic rules and procedures. In some cases, investors have alleged
that EIA processes and outcomes have breached more favorable
treaty protections ; in others, investors have used ISDS to render
legally irrelevant the whole EIA process, securing compensation
for their investments in projects irrespective of their fate under
the EIA.
34 - Bilcon v. Canada 65 is an example of the first type of case.
Bilcon, an American mining company, sought to develop a
mining and marine terminal project in Canada and was requi-
red to obtain various approvals from provincial and federal
authorities. As part of the EIA, an expert panel was assembled
with the mandate to provide a non-binding opinion on whether
or not the project should proceed in light of its potential impacts
on the human and natural environment. The panel proposed that
the project be rejected in light of its anticipated impacts, inclu-
ding that the project was inconsistent with « core community
values. » Taking into account the panel’s recommendation, offi-
cials in the provincial and federal governments then rejected the
project based on their assessments of potential negative impacts
on the environment and livelihoods dependent upon it. 66
35 - Bilcon and its shareholders sued under the NAFTA, taking
issue with various aspects and conclusions of the expert panel
process, and the governments’ subsequent decisions to reject the
project. The tribunal ruled in Bilcon’s favor, finding fault in parti-
cular with the expert panel’s approach, which considered the
project’s consistency with « core community values. » The tribu-
nal ordered Canada to pay $7 million (though the investors had
sought hundreds of millions in damages), stating that the « advi-
sory panel’s consideration of ’core community values’ went
beyond the panel’s duty to consider impacts on the ’human envi-
ronment,’ » in violation of the NAFTA. 67
36 - The dissenting arbitrator in the case, Professor Donald
McRae, highlighted at least two fundamental implications of the
award : first, that investors could bypass domestic remedies in
the case of disagreement with environmental review panels,
allowing a NAFTA tribunal to decide on the proper application
of domestic law, and « importing a damages remedy that is
unavailable under Canadian law. » Professor McRae noted that
this « is a significant intrusion into domestic jurisdiction and will
create a chill on the operation of environmental review
panels. » 68 Second, Prof. McRae noted that the « subjugation of
human environmental concerns to the scientific and technical
feasibility of a project is not only an intrusion into the way an
environmental review process is to be conducted, but also an
intrusion into the environmental public policy of the state. » 69
37 - Canada unsuccessfully challenged enforcement of the
award in Federal Court ; the presiding judge acknowledged that
the decision raises « significant policy concerns, » including « its
effects on the ability of NAFTA Parties to regulate environmen-
tal matters within their jurisdiction, the ability of NAFTA tribu-
nals to properly assess whether foreign investors have been
treated fairly under domestic environmental assessment process,
and the potential ’chill’ in the environmental assessment process
that could result from the majority’s decision, » but that the Fede-
ral Court had a very limited scope to review the tribunal’s deter-
mination. 70
38 - In addition to taking issue with how the expert panel inter-
preted Canadian law governing environmental impact assess-
ments and the relevance of « core community values », the tribu-
nal also found that Canada improperly discriminated against the
claimants by applying stricter scrutiny to the environmental and
social impacts of the claimant investors’ proposed project than
had been applied in separate previous projects. This aspect of the
tribunal’s decision makes it riskier for governments to strengthen
their legal frameworks (and interpretation thereof) over time.
Provided a claimant can point to an earlier period or instance
when rules, policies, or practices were more lax, and other
projects benefitted from more permissive frameworks or
approaches, they can claim that they are being discriminated
against relative to those earlier projects.
39 - Of course, it may be that the process at issue in Bilcon and
other domestic EIA processes are flawed. Indeed, while investors
may argue EIA processes are too lengthy and burdensome, there
is a significant amount of literature finding that EIA processes too
commonly fail to adequately assess or manage risks. 71. Assu-
ming that there are errors in the process, it is important to inter-
rogate the implications of investors’ being able to use ISDS to
highlight both those errors and secure monetary relief for them.
40 - Notably, ISDS only allows one side – the project propo-
nent – to challenge adverse decisions. When an EIA supports a
project, those opposed to the project neither are able to use the
ISDS process nor have access to equally powerful tools under
other areas of international law to advance their claims. This
creates a structural imbalance in favor of project proponents and
against other interests opposed to the proposed project, which
might be more expansive in scope and impact, and accompa-
nied by fewer mitigation options, than that supported by other
stakeholders.
41 - Moreover, the enforcement of treaty protections, as inter-
preted by investment tribunals, has allowed for a much broader
scope of review of EIA processes and outcomes than is available
domestically. In domestic jurisdictions, there are generally
pre-set rules of procedure or evidence or other statutory rules on
in Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention) done at Aarhus, Denmark (25
June 1998) art 6.
65. Clayton/Bilcon v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04.
66. Clayton/Bilcon v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Canada’s Counter-
Memorial on Damages, June 9, 2017, 30-41 ; Award on Damages, January
10, 2019, para. 172
67. Clayton/Bilcon v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04 ; In N. Lobel and
M. Fermeglia, op. cit., the authors note that in a case with a comparable
outcome, Compania del Desarollo de Santa Elena S.A. v Republic of Costa
Rica, the tribunal found that, « While an expropriation or taking for environ-
mental reasons may be classified as a taking for public purpose, and thus be
legitimate, [this][...] does not affect the nature of the measure or the compen-
sation to be paid for the taking [...]. The international source of the obliga-
tion to protect the environment makes no difference. » Compañia del Desar-
rollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica (Case No. ARB/96/1),
Award, 17 February 2000, para. 71. This finding holds important implica-
tions for future cases where, as was the case in Clayton/Bilcon v. Canada,
permit denial or revocation on the basis of climate or environmental protec-
tion will be challenged.
68. Ibid. para. 48.
69. Ibid. para. 49.
70. ’Judgement of the Federal Court of Canada,’ 2018 FC 436 (Conclusion)
(2018).
71. A. Barker, C. Jones, ’Investment Facilitation and EIS’s : A Critique of the
Performance of EIA within the Offshore Oil and Gas Sector,’ 43 Environmen-
tal Impact Assessment Review 31, 34 (2013) ; J. Li, ’Environmental Impact
Assessments in Developing Countries : An Opportunity for Greater Environ-
mental Security,’ (2008) USAID and FESS Working Paper No. 4. (discussing
environmental impact assessments in Asia) ; B. Anifowose, D. M. Lawler,
D. van der Host, and L. Chapman, ’A Systematic Quality Assessment of Envi-
ronmental Impact Statements in the Oil and Gas Industry,’ (2016) 572
Science of the Total Environment 570 (focusing on environmental impact
statements in Nigeria) ; A. Ingelson and C. Nwapi, ’Environmental Impact
Assessment Process for Oil and Mining Projects in Nigeria : A Critical Analy-
sis,’ (2012) 10 Law, Environment and Development Journal 35.
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the scope of judicial review that are designed to permit scrutiny
of EIA decisions, while also pragmatically confining the availa-
bility and scope of review as to when, for what, and how long liti-
gation can proceed. But claimants in ISDS cases are not limited
by those rules. Thus, although IIAs are often described as provi-
ding a last resort for investors, and offering checks only against
egregious government conduct, recourse to ISDS actually offers
a much more flexible, open-ended and promising avenue for
investors than the more consciously circumscribed path avai-
lable in domestic law.
42 - ISDS also offers investors remedies they would generally
not be entitled to under domestic law. In disputes in which inves-
tors have contested EIA processes or outcomes, they have been
awarded not just the additional costs incurred in participating in,
challenging, or redoing the allegedly flawed proceedings.
Instead, they have been awarded total sunk costs invested in the
project, raising the costs to governments of EIA processes or deci-
sions that investors dislike.
43 - Additionally, when investors have challenged permit
denials or other measures rejecting the project even before EIAs
had been completed or considered, tribunals have awarded
investors the sunk costs in developing or future lost profits anti-
cipated from the project. This is the second type of case referred
to above – those which effectively render EIA processes irrele-
vant – and includes disputes such as Copper Mesa v. Ecuador, 72
Bear Creek v. Peru, 73 and Tethyan Copper v. Pakistan. 74
44 - More specifically, under domestic processes, until an EIA
is approved and relevant domestic stakeholders have either
chosen not to exercise or have been unsuccessful in their efforts
to challenge the EIA process or decision, projects are not certain
to go ahead (and even then, their future is not secure, as other
permits and approvals, including those related to water usage
and other infrastructure, are often required). If the project does
not secure those essential approvals and fend off challenges, the
investor may not recover any of the project’s development costs,
much less future profits. The risks applying for and securing
permits and other authorizations are part of the risks of doing
business, particularly in highly regulated and controversial
industries and activities. Tribunal awards in projects without fully
approved EIAs and other permits therefore represent a windfall
to the investor and undue burden on the government. They
provide the investor funds it was not otherwise entitled to and
effectively ignore both the public’s power to participate in and
challenge EIA approvals, and the outcome determinative role
that EIAs are supposed to play.
2° Implications for Domestic Powers to Shape Local
Costs and Benefits
45 - A routine dynamic in ISDS is that of a resource-rich (and
often, but not always, less developed) country facing claims from
foreign investors with interests in resource extraction or exploi-
tation. There are costs and benefits to resource extraction, and
to the involvement of foreign investment in these processes. Each
state has a right and an obligation to weigh these carefully, also
taking into account the rights and interests of their stakeholders
to meaningfully participate in relevant decision making. A state
and affected individuals and communities should be able to
ensure that the domestic public benefits of each project outweigh
the public costs before a project is allowed to proceed. Ensuring
that investor interests are compatible with the interests and
further development of local communities, and enabling
meaningful local participation in project-related decision-
making, are central aspects of sustainable investment.
46 - In some cases, governments have adopted measures
governing extractive industry projects that do not address envi-
ronmental matters directly, but do so indirectly by trying to
ensure that the socio-economic gains from projects warrant the
consumption of exhaustible natural resources. Those economic
gains can be crucial for providing governments the budgetary
resources necessary to effectively monitor and regulate projects,
and promoting the economic gains that can drive environmen-
tal improvements based on the theory of the environmental
Kuznets curve. 75 These types of economic or development-
oriented measures, including efforts by local communities to
ensure project benefits outweigh environmental costs, have,
however, also been subject to ISDS challenges with follow-on
implications for environmental protection.
47 - In Mobil and Murphy v. Canada, for instance, investors
successfully contested government attempts to ensure that
extraction of oil in the regions of Labrador and Newfoundland
drove long-term development in a low-income region. The tribu-
nal determined that measures requiring that the claimants invest
a specified minimum amount in education, training, research,
and development (R&D) violated the NAFTA’s restrictions on
performance requirements. 76
48 - In the politically contentious claim against South Africa’s
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) policies, 77 Foresti v. South
Africa, a group of European mining investors claimed that BEE
requirements breached the protections provided by the Luxem-
bourgish and Italian investment treaties with South Africa. 78 BEE
policies obligated the companies, among other things, to meet
certain social and development objectives, which the claimants
alleged were not economically feasible. These included special
programs for Historically Disadvantaged South African
employees, such as housing and training.
49 - States’ environmental decision making, including and
especially related to extractive projects, should also be allowed
to change, with evolving environmental standards and norms,
democratic processes that reflect changing views of the electo-
rate, and new technological innovations and alternatives. But as
described above, IIA provisions can make such domestic policy
evolutions exceedingly costly. In 2019, for example, Aura Energy
Limited served a notice of dispute against Sweden under the
Energy Charter Treaty after the Mining Inspectorate of Sweden,
responding to domestic concerns over the environmental
impacts of uranium exploitation and in light of the availability
72. Copper Mesa Mining Corp. v Ecuador, PCA Case No. 2012-02, Award,
March 15, 2016 (awarding sunk costs notwithstanding the lack of an appro-
ved EIA).
73. Bear Creek Mining v. Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award, November
30, 2017 (awarding sunk costs notwithstanding the lack of an approved EIA).
74. Tethyan Copper v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/1, Award, July 12, 2019
(awarding roughly USD 4 billion in future lost profits, plus interest, for a
project notwithstanding the lack of approved EIAs).
75. The validity of the environmental Kuznets curve, and whether and when it
accurately describes or predicts environmental protection is a matter of conti-
nued study and debate.
76. Mobil and Murphy v. Canada (I), Case No. ARB(AF)/07/04 (ICSID. 2007).
77. BEE policies are for the benefit of Historically Disadvantaged South Africans,
as remedial measures responding to the effects of discrimination of the apar-
theid era. through socio-economic strategies such as facilitating ownership
and management of enterprises and investment in black-owned or managed
enterprises. B-BBEE Commission, ’Broad-Based Black Economic Empower-
ment Act,’ (2016) <https ://www.bbbeecommission.co.za/wp-content/
uploads/2016/09/Consolidated-B-BBEE-Act-2013.pdf> accessed 20 Novem-
ber 2019.
78. Accord entre l’Union économique belgo-luxembourgeoise et la République
d’Afrique du Sud concernant l’encouragement et la protection réciproques
des investissements, signed 14 August 1998 ; Agreement Between the
Government of the Republic of South Africa and the Government of the
Italian Republic on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed 6
September 1997.
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of alternative sources of energy, announced in 2018 that compa-
nies would no longer be able to apply for exploration or exploi-
tation permits for uranium mining. 79 In its notice, Aura stated
that protecting investors from the impacts of this sort of rule-
making is an understood purpose of the Energy Charter Treaty :
« the ECT provides a level playing field of rules to be observed
by all participating governments, thereby mitigating risks asso-
ciated with energy-related investment and trade. » 80 Particularly
in light of the global energy transition, in which states have
important choices– and changes– to make with respect to where
they source their energy, the implications of investor protections
blocking such domestic choices would be massive.
3° Implications for Relative Voice and Power under the
Law
50 - The extraordinary rights that ISDS confers on investors
come at an even greater cost to the rights of other stakeholders,
including domestic citizens that may be adversely impacted by
the investments and that seek to have a meaningful voice in
shaping whether and on what terms projects proceed. A number
of the cases referred to above highlight these issues, including
Bilcon, KCA, and Kingsgate. Another relevant case is Copper
Mesa v. Ecuador. 81
51 - Copper Mesa Mining Corporation’s exploration conces-
sion in the Junín region of Ecuador faced great opposition from
the community due to the environmental concerns surrounding
potential mining activities, doubts about the quality of informa-
tion being provided about the risks, and questions about the avai-
lability of meaningful opportunities to identify and mitigate risks
to the environment and livelihoods dependent upon it.
52 - When, in the mid-2000s, Copper Mesa acquired its inte-
rest in the concession, concerns about mining in the region were
already heightened. In the 1990s, another investor had tried to
develop the project. Tensions had escalated between that inves-
tor and local communities after an environmental assessment
that anticipated severe effects was made public. A landowner
opposing the project was shot, and the investor abandoned the
project. Citizens pursued a case before the World Bank Inspec-
tion Panel, successfully alleging that the project had violated the
World Bank’s internal guidelines on environmental assessments
and community consultations. Following these events, domes-
tic actors worked to pass legislation and constitutional reforms
aiming to better protect the environment in the region from future
extractive projects. Nevertheless, and against that background,
Copper Mesa secured a new exploration permit to try again to
develop the project.
53 - Rather than soothing lingering tensions and concerns over
the project, Copper Mesa inflamed them. An eventual ISDS tribu-
nal recognized and condemned the « reckless escalation of
violence which [Copper Mesa] (by itself and by its contractors
and sub-contractors) had introduced into the Junín area..., parti-
cularly with the employment of organised armed men in uniform
using tear gas canisters and firing weapons at local villagers and
officials. » 82 The tribunal further found that these corporate
efforts were part of « premeditated, disguised and well-funded
plans [by the company] to take the law into its own hands » 83
and opined that it « was miraculous that no-one had been killed
during one or more of these violent incidents. » 84 The company,
by its actions, had acquired « a malign reputation for intimida-
tion, threats, deception, mendacity, and violence amongst
members of the local communities. » 85
54 - In response to the escalating conflict at the mine site
exacerbated by the company, the government successfully
brokered a deal among the government, company and local
communities. But after the company failed to abide by the agree-
ment, tensions again rose, and community members blocked
access to the project. As the conflict became more acute, in April
2008, Ecuador passed a law permitting the revocation of mining
concessions falling into certain categories, including those
without environmental impact assessments and those that had
been pursued without a prior referendum process. Several
months later, in October 2008, Ecuador revoked Copper Mesa’s
concession, citing Copper Mesa’s failure to consult the commu-
nity. 86
55 - From Copper Mesa’s entry into the country through Ecua-
dor’s revocation of the permit, local governments, communities,
and other entities had pursued series of resolutions, declarations,
and legal actions indicating concerns about or opposition to the
project. In 2005, a local mayor filed an action to nullify the
concessions for lack of consultation. In 2005, an Ecuadorian
environmental organization and other non-governmental orga-
nizations filed a complaint under the OECD’s National Contact
Point (NCP) process ; in 2006, the relevant environment agency
deemed the company’s environmental impact assessment inad-
missible ; in 2006 and 2007, local communities requested police
protection from pro-mining-related abuses ; in 2007, communi-
ties participated in government-coordinated negotiations to find
a peaceful solution to the conflict ; and in 2009, community
members brought a case in Canadian courts to seek remedies
against Copper Mesa, two of the company’s directors, and the
Toronto Stock Exchange for harms caused by Copper Mesa in
Ecuador.
56 - Various legal and other barriers precluded lasting or
meaningful relief to these community claimants. For example,
doctrines limiting corporate and shareholder liability and esta-
blishing the separateness of corporate forms doomed the Cana-
dian case. As the court said :
« The threats and assaults alleged by the plaintiffs are serious
wrongs. Nothing in these reasons should be taken as undermi-
ning the plaintiffs’ rights to seek appropriate redress for those
wrongs, assuming that they are proven. But that redress must be
sought against proper parties, based on properly pleaded and
sustainable causes of action. The claims at issue in these procee-
dings do not fall in that category. » 87
57 - Ultimately, local communities were only able to trigger a
national government reaction when they protested and physi-
cally blocked roads. It was that action that the tribunal said the
government should have quashed, rather than giving « legal
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force to the physical blockade. » 88 According to the tribunal,
which sided for the investor in its claims that the government
violated the treaty’s fair and equitable treatment and expropria-
tion provisions, « [i]t’s of course difficult to say now what [Ecua-
dor] should have done to resolve all the claimants’ difficulties
and still more so whether anything it could have done would
have changed the claimants’ position for the better. Plainly the
Government of Quito could hardly have declared war on its own
people. Yet in the Tribunal’s view, it could not do nothing. » 89
Ecuador was ordered to pay more than $19 million in damages
to the company. 90
58 - Some commentators noted favorably that the tribunal
« only » awarded the investor sunk costs, suggesting that the
ISDS case thereby properly penalized the investor for its miscon-
duct. But this fails to recognize the windfall nature of the award.
Rather than penalizing the investor, the award insulates the
investor from the risks of loss it otherwise would have borne due
to the risks of project failure caused by its own fault and/or to the
rights, voice, and power of other stakeholders. This fact pattern
and outcome send signals to other potential claimants, counsel,
arbitrators, and governments, encouraging other suits aimed at
overriding community voices or concerns, changing government
decisions, recouping sunk costs, and/or securing compensation
for future lost profits even in cases of clear corporate wrongdoing
and projects of uncertain fate.
59 - More recently, for instance, in Armenia, local communi-
ties protested the Amulsar Gold Project owned by Lydian Inter-
national, because of concerns over the mine’s environmental
impacts on nearby lakes, mineral springs and agricultural land,
particularly in light of its location in an area with significant seis-
mic activity. 91 Lydian’s subsidiaries in Canada and the UK filed
arbitration requests against Armenia after the project was tempo-
rarily shut-down due to protests. 92 As in so many cases, as
described above, the threat of arbitration seemed sufficient to
change the government’s mind ; in August 2019, Prime Minis-
ter Nikol Pashinyan announced that mining could proceed 93,
saying that the project posed no environmental threat.
60 - In Guatemala, investors have also subverted the rights of
citizens with respect to environmental decision-making. In 2010,
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)
recommended that the Guatemalan government close the Marlin
mine, operated by the Canadian company Goldcorp, because
of the negative impacts the mine posed to the surrounding envi-
ronment and local indigenous populations. Mayan communities
in San Miguel Ixtahuacán contested that they had never
consented to the mine. 94 Following the IACHR recommenda-
tion, the President agreed to suspend operations, but the mine
reopened shortly thereafter. It was later reported that the Guate-
malan government had cited the threat of ISDS as a motive
behind re-opening the mine, as it did not wish for the investors
« to activate the World Bank’s [investment court] or to invoke the
clauses of the free trade agreement to have access to internatio-
nal arbitration and subsequent claim of damages to the state. » 95
Another mining operation, owned by U.S.-based company KCA,
was also met with resistance from impacted indigenous groups
in Guatemala. Though its Environmental Impact Assessment was
approved by the Ministry of Energy and Mines in 2011, oppo-
nents alleged that the operating permit held by the company was
not legal as they had failed to carry out community consultations,
required under domestic law. 96 The Supreme Court ordered an
official suspension of the mine in 2016 for lack of prior consul-
tation with the indigenous population. 97 KCA submitted an offi-
cial notice of intent to Guatemala in May 2018, after the mining
project had been suspended for two years, and filed for arbitra-
tion that November. The case is pending. 98
Conclusion and Recommendations
61 - Notably, many treaties, especially free trade agreements,
recognize the importance of bilateral or multilateral cooperation
on environmental protection and preservation. Treaties include
non-derogation provisions, committing the treaty partners not to
lower environmental standards or enforcement in order to attract
or retain investment. The NAFTA created a Commission for Envi-
ronmental Cooperation (CEC) 99 ; the US-Peru FTA includes an
annex on forest governance 100 that initially earned the support
of environmental groups (though that support has waned in
implementation) 101 ; the Japan-Mexico Economic Partnership
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Agreement, « recognizing the need for environmental preserva-
tion and improvement to promote sound and sustainable deve-
lopment, » commits the parties to a number of cooperative acti-
vities. 102 However, these provisions to promote cooperative
environmental protection and governance have had disappoin-
ting results 103 for a variety of reasons, including the lack of enfor-
cement mechanisms or the will to enforce.
62 - By contrast, the dispute-settlement provision in the invest-
ment chapter, which can be enforced directly by investors
without their home state involvement, has much sharper teeth,
and investors and their counsel have demonstrated their
eagerness to bite. In recent years, some of the newer treaties have
added in some language in the investment provisions or dispute
settlement sections that attempt to safeguard government regu-
latory space, either specifically for environmental measures or
for public interest measures more generally. A survey conduc-
ted by the OECD in 2011 found that, of 1,623 sample IIAs, 5.2%
include language « [r]eserving policy space for environmental
regulation for the entire treaty » and 1.3% do so for specific
subject matters. 104 However, these added provisions or excep-
tions have not proven effective. While examples of tribunal inter-
pretations of police power provisions and environmental excep-
tions have been limited to date, they have been interpreted so
restrictively as to negate their intent. In Bear Creek v. Peru, for
instance, the tribunal ignored and failed to apply the police
powers language expressly contained in the treaty. 105 It also
interpreted the treaty’s general exceptions clause exceedingly
narrowly by, among other things, appearing to require the inves-
tor to have been at legal fault for the environmental (or social)
problem a measure seeks to address in order for the measure to
be covered by the exception. 106 Language emphasizing the
importance of corporate social responsibility and the protection
of human rights has similarly not seemed to play any role in cabi-
ning investor protections when ISDS tribunals are interpreting
and applying the treaty. 107 And, even if exceptions or police
powers principles apply, tribunals nevertheless may still require
compensation for an affected investor. 108
63 - In large part because of the growing number of cases that
have continued to challenge – often successfully through settle-
ment or decision – public interest measures, including but not
limited to the environmental measures discussed in this chapter,
governments and especially their citizens are starting to question
the legitimacy of ISDS and its suitability for 21st century gover-
nance challenges. 109
64 - Investment has a critical role to play in achieving the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including those on
environmental protection and restoration and access to justice ;
accordingly, investment governance – including through inter-
national commitments and cooperation – has an equally critical
role in shaping those investment flows and their contributions to
and impacts on sustainable development. Enough ISDS cases
have illustrated the tremendous risks of putting enforceable
investor protections at the heart of investment governance.
Global investment governance needs to be redesigned for the
21st century, with people and the planet at the core. 110ê
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